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Review Summary: Good case; bad arguments |
Date: 2008-04-24 |
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Details: First, I am an atheist. Second, I am an atheist who believes that given the right conditions, the theory of intelligent design would pass constitutional muster. It does not promote a religion (thought it is compatible with many religions, including deism), and it does not interfere with people's right to practice their religion freely. While it is beyond question that those who wrote the "ID statement" into the Dover curriculum had religious motivaitons, it need not be the case that ID is INHERENTLY a religious doctrine, or have the effect of promoting a religion.
The problem is not with Francis Beckwith's position; the problem is with the reasoning he uses to get there. In fact, for a book whose first word is "Law," it is a bit suprising that only two of the chapters are really devoted to the legal arguments.
The first chapter to focus on law focuses on the cases to do with Creation Science (the evolutionary ancestor of intelligent design). It goes through the majority opinions and dissents in these cases and finds - quite unsuprisingly - that ID would not fall into the same camp as creation science, as it is not an endorsement of religion with ties to a holy book, as was the case with creation science. (Beckwith also suggests that ID is not an inherently religous doctrine and that, in order to be disallowed, the Court would have to find a religious motive or effect to adopting a policy teaching ID. It is interesting to note that in teh case of Kitzmiller, written after this book, that is EXACTLY what kept ID out of the curriculum.)
The next chapter - certainly the weakest one, where Beckwith shows his naivete - is a chapter outlining the philosophical arguments leveled by ID proponents against evolution. All have been answered many times (though Beckwith doesn't really cite those answers), and some plaln do not make sense. Beckwith criticizes methodological naturalism, for instance, by suggesting that methodological naturalism is not itself a scientific proposition based on observation, and thus, it is self-refuting. This old linguistic trick has been gotten out of many ways, only one of which is to suggest that such a claim does not refute, but justifies, itself by showing that, by its use, science has progressed, and progressed, and progressed. (One can imagine how much science would have progressed without methodological naturalism - if we just stopped at "god must have done it." Hmm.) Tired argument, but Beckwith is quite fond of it.
It is in the latter part of this chapter that Beckwith starts making the political and legal argument as to why ID should be allowed in schools. He suggests, quoting Plantinga, that in a pluralistic society where - apparently - the idea that science ONLY studies the natural is controversial, we should teach alternate conceptiosn of science, such that evolution is taught to be well-established ONLY IF you believe in methodological naturalism. In turn, ID would be taught as well-established IF you believe in methodological supernaturalism.
Of course, pluralism is only ONE aim of schools! In fact, the whole idea of standardized education belies the idea that pluralism - rather than ensuring a degree of homoegeneity - is the main purpose of schools. Science classes, quite simply, exist to teach students a realistic picture of what sceince has come up with. Science has not come up with ID (a lawyer named Philip Johnson did that with the help of William Paley). Science has come up with evolution, though. And that is the realistic picture of what science has discovered in the area of biology.
To put it differently, those - like Beckwith and Plantinga - who value pluralism in education above all else, should also be making the argument that history teachers should teach that the Holocaust did not happen so that those people who do not believe history should rely on evidence might be satisfied. (Read this chapter, and see if Plantinga's argument cited by Beckwith would not very easily justify that!)
It is only in the last chapter that Beckwith gets to suggesting the legal reasons why ID is not a violation of the first amendment. Is it a religion? No. Does it hinder people's free exercise? No. Does its exclusion on grounds that it is a faith tantamount to a violation of the first amendment? Beckwith says yes, becasue excluding a viewpoint just because it is compatible with a faith is tantamount to discriminating against religion.
But did you notice where Beckwith slips up here? He cannot, in one chapter, deny that ID is a religion, while, in another chapter, suggest that blocking ID from the classroom is discrimination against religion (which he suggests ID is not).
In the end, he is right on a few points (those I reviwed in the first paragraph of this review). Otherwise, his case is quite bad, assuming that one is familiar with the literature on the subject (as there are many great refutations of all the thinkers he points to to support his arguments).
Read this; then read those. |
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Review Summary: A Noted Scholar Explains Why Intelligent Design is Constitutional |
Date: 2006-06-21 |
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Details: Legal scholar Francis J. Beckwith recounts the legal history of court battles over the teaching of biological origins. Though many thought that the landmark Supreme Court case Edwards v. Aguillard would permanently settle these questions by ruling creationism unconstitutional, Beckwith observes that intelligent design poses a new challenge to legal scholars. Beckwith, who has published about teaching intelligent design in law journals such as Harvard Law Review, provides a thorough treatment of the subject.
After recounting the history of cases which involved the "Creator in the courtroom,' Beckwith turns to analyzing intelligent design. Under various legal definitions of religion, Beckwith contends that design is not religion as conventionally understood because it derives its support from empirical data and philosophical arguments. Intelligent design, Beckwith explains, is distinct from creationism, for it derives its support from the scientific argument rather than religious texts such as the book of Genesis. Design also fails other legal tests for "religion," such as the "parallel position test" because it does not function as a religion in the lives of its proponents. While design may come to conclusions shared by some religions, this does not necessarily make it "religion" for legal purposes. After all, Beckwith observes, courts have acknowledged that "a decision respecting the subject matter to be taught in public schools does not violate the Establishment Clause simply because the material to be taught `happens to harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.'"
Finally, Beckwith argues that intelligent design does not fit under the Edwards test for religion because it lacks a historical connection with the Scopes Trial and other Genesis-inspired anti-evolution endeavors. Teaching about intelligent design could be justified on the basis that it improves the religious "neutrality" of a curriculum.
Beckwith provides a deep and thorough treatment of the legal arguments raised by critics of teaching design in public schools. Those interested in studying the relevant technical legal arguments surrounding the teaching of intelligent design will require an understanding of Beckwith's well-reasoned position explained in this book. |
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Review Summary: A well-informed, even-handed assessment |
Date: 2004-11-11 |
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Details:
Francis Beckwith's LAW, DARWINISM, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION does an excellent job of sorting through and analyzing the relevant court cases and legal arguments concerning the teaching of creation/evolution in public schools. With the emergence of the Intelligent Design (ID) movement, a much stronger and more sophisticated case can be made, both empirically and philosophically, for the plausibility of a Creator and Designer. The strength of these arguments cannot justifiably be barred from public education curricula.
Beckwith suggests a point I would like to underscore: the "creation vs. evolution" debate is often a red herring, masking the more fundamental metaphysical issues at stake. First, there are theistic evolutionists (Howard Van Till calls this view "fully gifted creation"), who believe that God has been working through the evolutionary process in the unfolding of His purposes. Darwin himself started out believing this. In the early editions of *The Origin of Species*, Darwin himself spoke of "laws impressed on matter by the Creator" and "life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one" (Ch. 15, "Recapitulation and Conclusion"). Later, Darwin apparently gave up on his faith based, not on any scientific evidence, but due to theological and philosophical assumptions (which turn out to be deeply problematic: see Cornelius Hunter, DARWIN'S GOD [Brazos Press]). So the ultimate issue is not "creation vs. evolution" but "naturalism vs. supernaturalism." Whether we should prefer naturalistic explanations over supernaturalistic ones is a philosophical matter, not a scientific one.
Second, biological evolution presupposes (a) the emergence of the universe a finite time ago and (b) its delicately-balanced conditions for life. Without these, the process of evolution could not even get started. One could add that (c) simply because conditions are conducive to the emergence of life, this by no means guarantees that non-living matter will produce living organisms. The emergence of first life itself is a huge difficulty for the naturalist (see Bradley, Olson, and Thaxton, THE MYSTERY OF LIFE'S ORIGIN* [Philosophical Press])..
To underscore the constitutional legitimacy of ID in public education, one could make the minimalist case for bracketing the issue of biological evolution itself and first focusing specifically on a Creator and Designer as the best explanation for (a) the emergence of the universe from nothing a finite time ago and (b) the "Goldilocks effect"--that the many interlocking conditions for biological life are "just right." Even if evolution has taken place, the explanatory context of a powerful and intelligent Being makes much better sense of (a) and (b) than its naturalistic alternatives. Once these are in place, only then could evolution get going.
I heartily recommend Beckwith's refreshing, insightful book and wish it all the success it deserves. |
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Review Summary: It is "Your Daddy's Fundamentalism" |
Date: 2004-06-29 |
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Details: Next to sex education, evolution is the most controversial school subject. This book makes the modest argument that an idea called "Intelligent Design" should be taught in public schools alongside evolution. The author sets out a framework for analysis which unfortunately leads to the opposite conclusion, failing to achieve its modest goal. I read it because it received a glowing review in the Harvard Law Review, entitled, "Not Your Daddy's Fundamanetalism." The author's argument is that various court cases rejected creationism in public schools because it violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The author argues that Intelligent Design should be treated differently. First it is not the "New Earth" creationism, which was rejected by the courts. Furthermore, attempts by various courts to define "science" fail on philosophical grounds, so there is no philosophical preference between evolution and Intelligent Design. Methodological Naturalism, the basis for evolution is not a scientific theory but a philosophical outlook no more or no less valid than Intelligent Design's outlook. The author does not conceal the fact that he objects to evolution because it "cannot account for the existence of the universe, morality rationality," and therefore it should be rejected on philosophical grounds as the overarching scientific theory of biology.
According to the author, the 1987 U.S. Supreme Court Case, Edwards v Aguillard, struck down the creationist law based on (1) the historical continuity with the famous Scopes trial and other well publicized creationist-evolutionist debates throughout the twentieth century; (2) How closely the curriculum content parallels the Genesis story or that curriculum is proscribed because it departs from Genesis; (3) the motives of the statute's supporters; and (4) Whether the statute was a legitimate means to achieve an appropriate state ends. The author attempts to argue that the analysis of these points applied to "Intelligent Design" leads to a different result. The author's suggested framework is plausible, but when applied to the facts as recognized by the author, himself, it fails. As a general proposition, how do we determine whether any idea is to be presented to students in an elementary school science class? A list of candidates could include atomic theory, Newtonian physics, evolution, relativity, quantum mechanics, yeti, astrology, ES, geocentricism, creationism and Intelligent design. The Author makes the incorrect and novel idea that a discipline, such as science or medicine, cannot define itself. Only philosophy, not coincidentally the author's area of expertise, is qualified to sort out which of the above ideas qualify as true "science." In McLean v Arkansas, the trial judge determined that "science" had several characteristics. Application of the McLean criteria would quickly eliminate yeti, ESP creationism and Intelligent Design from the above list, so the author suggests that "demarcation issues' prevent a trial judge from reliably distinguishing between "real science" and imposters. Beckwith especially relies on the methodology of Larry Laudan, who suggests that the demarcation is unsolvable, i.e., it is not possible or desirable to distinguish between science and non-science. Laudan however, completes the argument that Beckwith does not-Laudan holds that some ideas are demonstrably scientifically wrong. Laudan holds that it is possible to determine what those ideas are, and Intelligent Design is one of them. I don't know why the author did not refer to Laudan's specific rejection of Intelligent Design. Amazingly, at the time he wrote the book (2002), the author conceded that there was insufficient scholarly support for Intelligent Design. (p. 43, fn. 125). Since 2002, that situation has become worse, not better, according to the author, who, as of March 2004, holds that he does not favor teaching intelligent design in public schools because of a lack of scientific documentation for the theory (http://www.moteworthy.com/archives/000242.html). This is an amazing admission in light of the myriad of footnotes citing nearly all the Intelligent Design literature as of 2002, including the collected works of Michael Behe, Philip Johnson and William Demski. At this point, Beckwith's argument has to be re-phrased to, "Is it unconstitutional to teach incorrect ideas as established science?" After all, a law may be stupid without being unconstitutional. Although Beckwith (and Scalia) may disagree, a court is entitled to ask why on earth anyone would want to teach a subject such as intelligent design (or ESP) with no scientific evidence in support and vast amounts contradicting it. (Beckwith's analysis of evolution is cursory, incorrect and irrelevant to his argument). It is reasonable to suggest that the idea is a sham in an effort to inject religious creationism into science class. If so, then the four Edwards criteria make sense. Reference to the history of evolution /creationism debates, the religious motivations of Intelligent Design proponents, their extra-scientific comments, their refusal to address the evolution's scientific evidence and predictive powers and legislative history would all be relevant under the Edwards analysis. Applying the Edwards criteria to Intelligent Design leads to the conclusion that it is a sham and should be treated the same as all other forms of creationism. Teaching about Intelligent Design in a philosophy, religion or history course would be a different matter entirely. |
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Review Summary: Well-written book with a modest conclusion |
Date: 2004-05-10 |
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Details: I've read virtually all of the law reviews written on the constitutional status of presenting alternative theories to evolution in the publics school classroom. Francis Beckwith's modest conclusion falls just slightly to the right of assessments made by other respected legal scholars like Kent Greenawalt and Jay Wexler. It is his contention that an alternative theory like Intelligent Design could probably survive an Establishment Clause challenge whereas the Genesis-based creation science presentation has not. Greenawalt and Wexler aren't sure and tend to think ID might not survive an Establishment Challenge. As far as quality goes, the book is well-written and researched. It also display's Beckwith's strength as a philosopher as he parses arguments. The bottom line is that Beckwith offers a very modest conclusion. Intelligent Design may someday be offered as an alternative theory of origins in public school and may survive an Establishment Clause challenge largely due to its lack of allegiance to any theological tradition. The theory makes no attempt to offer an explanation of who or what provides the agency of design Beckwith's book is a valuable contribution to the literature estimating the constitutional status of intelligent design. If a court case does arise, his book will certainly be part of the material considered. |
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out of 28 Reviews
