Description: This widely anticipated volume offers a systematic introduction to and striking analysis of the central issues animating current debate in moral philosophy. It will be of interest to anyone with a serious interest in the philosophical foundations of ethics. Topics discussed include: realist vs. anti-realist accounts of moral truth, cognitivist vs expressivist accounts of moral judgement; internalist vs externalist accounts of the relation between moral judgment and the will; Humean vs anti-Humean theories of motivation; and the debate between those who think that morality is a system of hypothetical imperatives and those who think that moral requirements are categorical. In 2000, The Moral Problem received The American Philosophical Association's first APA Book Prize for excellence in scholarship.
Customer Reviews
Review Summary: An elegant solution to pressing problems
Date: 2000-04-13
Details: This book is the most exciting book that I have read in a long time. Prime virtues of the book are clarity of exposition, and breath of topics covered. Smith shows how many controversial issues in contemporary meta-ethics come together in what he calls `the Moral Problem': three of our intuitions - three plattitudes about moral judgement and human action - seem to be inconsistent. Most current ethical theories deal with this apparent inconsistency by rejecting one of the three plattitudes. Smith, on the other hand, provides a very elegant solution to this moral paradox by showing how the three plattitudes are both consistent and true.
Plattitude 1: moral judgements have a truth value (objectivity of moral judgements). Plattitude 2: moral judgements consitute reasons for action (practicality of moral judgements). Plattitude 3: desires are constitutive of reasons for action (folk psychology).
1 and 2 entail that beliefs - states that have a truth value - constitute reasons for action, contrary to 3. 2 and 3 imply that moral judgements are (or express) desires - states that do not have a truth value - contrary to 1. 1 and 3 result in the conclusion that desires have truth values, contrary to 2 - as reasons for action are constituted by non-cognitive states, i.e. states without a truth value.
As will be clear to those familiar with contemporary meta-ethics, proposing a solution to this problem requires an analysis of rival solutions as given by for example expressivism, cognitivism, and error theory. Smith gives such an analysis and forcefully argues that these solutions are flawed. His own solution starts by pointing out that - although plattitude 3 is indeed a plattitude and should be retained - it is not the whole story about human motivation. If you want to find out more about these issues, this is the book to read.
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